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Abstract
I construct a matching model to explain the labor market transition between em-
ployment, unemployment and nonparticipation, and evaluate the quantitative effects
of firing costs. The model has several features that are distinguished from previ-
ous studies: endogenous labor force participation, different job-search decisions and
imperfect insurance markets. I find that the model is able to account for the U.S.
labor market, especially the gross labor-force transition rates. I also find that firing
costs as a type of firing tax have a negative effect on the layoff rate, the job-finding
probability and the participation rate. In particular, the effect of a decrease in the
job-finding probability is greater than the effect of a decrease in the layoff rate, and
this results in an increase in the unemployment-to-population ratio. Finally, firing
costs make individuals’ job tenures longer and skew the asset distribution to the
right.
Keywords: Search and Matching, Labor Force Participation, Firing Costs
JEL Classification: E24, J21, J64, J65
∗The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank
of Korea.
1
1 Introduction
Any policy that affects one of the three states of employment, unemployment and out-
of-the-labor-force (OLF) also affects other states, because the employment-to-population
ratio, unemployment rate and participation rate are jointly determined. For that reason,
this paper builds up a model having both a labor force participation decision and a job
search decision, and evaluates labor market policies such as firing costs.
Most existing studies which explain the dynamics of individual labor market decisions
have postulated a fixed labor force size and analyzed models having only two labor force
states: employment and unemployment. In reality, however, the labor force size is not
fixed, because people move not only within the labor force but also into and out of it. The
models with only employment and unemployment cannot account for individuals who move
in and out of the labor force. In addition, since the unemployed in these models cannot but
search for work, the models cannot capture the labor force participation decision through
the job search decision, either. For that reason, I introduce another labor force status,
out-of-the-labor-force (OLF), and make a distinction between unemployment and OLF to
fully characterize the possible individual labor force decisions.
There have been other attempts to explain the individual search decisions based on
models having employment, unemployment and OLF. Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Hæfke
and Reiter (2006) and Pries and Rogerson (2008), among others, extend the Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) matching model to incorporate OLF. However, these studies have
limitations in terms of predicting individual labor market transitions.
The first type of distinction between unemployment and OLF a` la Garibaldi and Was-
mer (2005) and Hæfke and Reiter (2006) is made on the basis of whether a person is
searching or not. The unemployed are defined as those who are searching for work, and
nonparticipants as those who are not searching for work. Since the unemployed find a
job with some probability but nonparticipants thus do not, transitions from OLF to em-
ployment are not made. For that reason, Hæfke and Reiter (2006) set the model period
to one-week, to enable the transitions from OLF to employment in their model. We cast
doubt on that method, however, because their classification is inconsistent with the clas-
sification of the Current Population Survey (CPS), and even the steady-state version of
their model does not very well predict what the data on the transition probabilities show.
The second type of distinction a` la Pries and Rogerson (2008) is made on the basis of
whether a person is searching actively or inactively. The unemployed are defined as those
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who are searching actively, and nonparticipants as those who are searching inactively. An
active search implies a search with high intensity and an inactive search one done with
low intensity, so that an active searcher has a high job-finding probability and an inactive
searcher a low one. Since all nonparticipants have employment opportunities, Pries and
Rogerson (2008) can explain a high transition rate from unemployment to employment
and a low transition rate from OLF to employment. In the actual data, however, not all
nonparticipants are actually job-searchers. Moreover, we cannot find such large flows from
unemployment to OLF without sizable idiosyncratic shocks such as market or non-market
productivity shocks.
In this paper, I build up a matching model in which workers are risk-averse and can be
employed, unemployed or out of the labor force. Workers who have employment opportu-
nities decide whether to work or not, while workers who have no employment opportunities
decide whether to search or not. The job-finding process has two steps. In the first step,
each worker receives a piece of information on possible employment opportunities. Those
who have a more promising piece of information are more likely to search, and based on
how promising the information is each worker decides whether to search or not. In the
second step, workers who decide to search make search efforts and take costly actions. In
the model, the search decision then depends on the quality of search signal, meaning “how
promising a piece of information is,” and on the worker’s asset holdings.
I also attempt to make labor force classifications consistent with the CPS. According
to the CPS definition, the unemployed are persons aged 16 years and older who had no
employment during the reference week and had made specific efforts to find employment
sometime during the four-week period ending with the reference week. The CPS definition
of unemployment captures two important features of unemployment. The first is that the
unemployed did search for work during the last four weeks before the survey interview.
The second is that they were not employed at the time of the interview. In the standard
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model, in which there are only employment
and unemployment, the unemployed include both those who have not found employment
or have separated and those who are currently looking for work. The law of motion for
unemployment from the standard model shows that the current-period unemployment is
then determined by the former group, while determining the latter group.
To be consistent with the CPS, in this paper, persons in the state of unemployment
are defined as those who search but do not find employment, as well as those who have
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worked and separated involuntarily.1 Nonparticipants are on the other hand defined as
those who do not search or those who have worked and quit voluntarily. In addition to
the assumption that workers are risk-averse, it is also assumed that there are no available
insurance markets. Workers save and accumulate an interest-bearing asset which can be
used to smooth their consumption across labor force states.
I find that my model is able to account for the U.S. labor market, especially the gross
labor-force transition rates. This is in marked contrast to the Pries and Rogerson (2008)
model, in which the large flows from unemployment to OLF, the so-called discouraged
worker effect, are not found without idiosyncratic shocks such as market or non-market
productivity shocks. Second, the model also accounts for the transitions from OLF to
the labor force in an intuitively appealing way. In particular, this can be done without
assuming that nonparticipants have employment opportunities or adjusting the time period
of the model.
When it comes to the effects of firing costs as a type of firing tax, numerical experiments
show two important effects. First, we find that firing costs have a negative effect on both
the layoff rate and the job-finding probability. In other words, firing costs reduce the
number of endogenous separations as well as that of vacancies posted. For reasonable
parameter values, the effect of a decrease in the job-finding probability is greater than the
effect of a decrease in the layoff rate, and this results in an increase in the unemployment-
to-population ratio. Second, firing costs also have a negative effect on the participation
rate. A decrease in the layoff rate makes individuals’ job tenures longer and causes a
skewing of asset distribution to the right. The number of workers who are located outside
the participation margin increases, and the participation rate decreases.
Early investigations of the effects of firing restrictions were undertaken by Bentolila and
Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990), who analyzed a partial equilibrium model to study the
consequences of firing and hiring costs in the labor demand of a monopolist. Hopenhayn
and Rogerson (1993) were the first to perform a general equilibrium analysis, but they did
not consider search frictions and incomplete insurance markets. They find that a tax on
job destruction has a sizable negative impact on total employment, and welfare losses are
large. Later on, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) extended Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
model and introduced labor market frictions and incomplete insurance markets. Unlike
Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), they find that firing restrictions can have large positive
1Krusell et al. (2008) define the unemployed as those who would like to work at the given market wage
rate but are not able to find employment.
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effects on employment and welfare. They do not, however, consider endogenous labor
force participation decisions.2 To my knowledge, this is the first work which investigates
the effects of firing costs under environments of an incomplete market and endogenous
labor force participation decisions.
This paper is structured as follows. The model economy is introduced in Section 2,
and is calibrated in Section 3. The steady-state equilibrium of the model and the effects
of firing costs are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model is a variant of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) matching model and the
Bils, Chang and Kim (2007) model. In my model, workers can be employed, unemployed
or out of the labor force.
2.1 Environments
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived and risk-averse workers with total mass equal to
one. Each worker has preferences defined by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln ct +B
uIst
(
1− Iwt
)
+Bo
(
1− Ist
)(
1− Iwt
)}
(1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and ct is consumption. I
w
t is an indicator function
which takes a value of one if the worker is working and zero otherwise. Ist is an indicator
function which takes a value of one if the worker is looking for a job and zero otherwise.
Parameters Bu and Bo denote the utilities from leisure when looking for a job and out of
the labor force, respectively.
A worker who has asset holdings at faces the following budget constraint:
ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + wtI
w
t + h (1− Iwt ) (2)
at+1 ≥ 0 (3)
2Ljungqvist (2002) studies the effects of higher layoff costs in a matching model, but he does not
consider worker heterogeneity, incomplete markets or nonparticipation. Veracierto (2007) also evaluates
the effects of tenure-dependent firing taxes. Although he explicitly considers nonparticipation, he does not
have heterogeneity because his model is based on the Lucas and Prescott (1974) island model.
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where at+1 is the next-period asset holdings, wt wages and h household production. Workers
are not allowed to borrow, so that at+1 is greater than zero.
There is also a continuum of identical firms (or entrepreneurs). Each firm maximizes
the discounted present value of profits:
E0
∞∑
t=0
(
1
1 + r
)t
pit (4)
where pit is the firm’s profit in period t. With the assumption of a small open economy,
the interest rate r is given exogenously.
In each period, firms can be active or vacant. An active firm is one that is matched
with a worker and is currently producing output using a production technology, denoted
by z, which z is idiosyncratic match-specific productivity and follows an AR(1) process in
logs:
ln z′ = ρ ln z +  (5)
where ρ is the persistence parameter and  is a normal random variable with mean 0 and
standard deviation σ. We let pi (zj|zi) denote the discretized Markov process which is equiv-
alent to Pr [zt+1 = zj|zt = zi]. All active firms face an exogenous separation probability,
denoted by λ.
A vacant firm is one that is posting a vacant position and looking for a worker. At the
end of each period, all vacant firms find a worker with some probability, denoted by q, and
production begins at the highest value of match-specific shock, denoted by z. I assume
that firms can create a job without cost, but have to pay k units of the consumption good
to post a vacant position.
The number of new matches between vacancies and job-searchers is determined by a
matching function which ensures that the probability of finding a job and of filling a vacancy
lies between 0 and 1. Following den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) and Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008), I choose
m (u, v) =
uv
(uα + vα)1/α
(6)
where u is an efficiency unit of the number of job-searchers, v is the number of vacancies and
α is the parameter of the matching function. A job-seeker who has search intensity or search
signal quality s will find a job with probability sp (θ) = sm (u, v) /u = s (1 + θ−α)−1/α, and
a firm will meet a worker with probability q = m (u, v) /v = (1 + θα)−1/α, where θ denotes
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the vacancy-to-searcher ratio.
2.2 Information Quality
The individual job search decision consists of two parts. In the first part, each individual
obtains job related information without any effort or any cost. For example, one can look
over the help wanted classifieds when reading a newspaper or one can hear from friends
about vacancy openings. Based on such costless information, each individual constructs an
expectation about the job-finding probability and then decides whether to search or not.
In the second part, individuals who decide to search have to take costly actions to obtain
a job, such as filling out applications, writing resumes, and going to job interviews.3
I extend the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Bils, Chang and Kim (2007) matching
models to allow people to react to information quality. There are many locations in the
model economy among which some have vacancies. Workers do not know the locations
where matches actually take place, but firms know. Each person who does not have
employment opportunities receives a signal with quality (or precision) s, where the signal
indicates the locations where matches take place and the attached quality shows the validity
of the signal. Once a person receives a signal with quality s, the signal is correct with
probability s while it is meaningless with probability 1− s. The probability that a person
arrives at the locations with vacancies is then s.
Signal quality is generated by the following logistic function of random variable x,
because signal quality s lies between 0 and 1:
s =
ex
1 + ex
(7)
where random variable x follows an AR(1) process:
x′ = ρxx+ (1− ρx)x+ η (8)
where x is the unconditional mean, ρx is the persistence parameter and η is a normal
random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation ση. We let pis (sj|si) denote the
discretized Markov process which is equivalent to Pr [st+1 = sj|st = si]. Meanwhile, workers
who have employment opportunities but decide not to work also receive signal quality si
3For more details, see Moon (2007).
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with probability pis (si), which is the discretized unconditional probability distribution
Pr [st = si].
2.3 Labor Force Classification
At the beginning of each period, there are three types of workers (based on the classi-
fications made one period before): employed, unemployed and OLF. Workers who are
classified as unemployed or OLF in the last period receive a signal with quality and then
choose to search or not. If they choose not to search, they are classified as OLF. If they
choose to search, then they are classified as either employed or unemployed, depending
upon the match outcomes. That is, those who search and find employment are classified
as employed, and those who search but do not find employment as unemployed.
The employed, who observe an idiosyncratic match-specific productivity shock, choose
whether to work on their current jobs or not. Those choosing to work separate with prob-
ability λ at the end of that period. The separatees are classified as OLF if the exogenous
separations are regarded as voluntary separations, while those who do not separate are
classified as employed. On the other hand, those who choose not to work receive a signal
with quality, and then decide whether to search or not. Their labor force classifications
are made in the same way as for unmatched workers.
2.4 Recursive Equilibrium
2.4.1 Value Functions
The individual worker’s problem can be formulated recursively. Let W (a, z) denote the
value function for a worker who decides to work, U (a, s) the value function for a worker who
decides to search and O (a, s) the value function for a worker who decides to neither work
nor search, where a denotes asset holdings, z idiosyncratic match-specific productivity, and
s signal quality.
A worker who does not have employment opportunities decides whether to search or
not based on his(her) signal quality. The unmatched workers solve the following decision
problem:
N (a, s) = max
{
U (a, s) , O (a, s)
}
(9)
We let Is (a, s) denote the unmatched worker’s decision function which is 1 if U (a, s) ≥
O (a, s) and otherwise zero.
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The value function for a worker who decides to search is given by
U (a, s) = max
cu,a′u
{
ln cu +B
u + β (1− sp)E
[
N (a′u, s
′) |s
]
+βspE
[
max
{
W (a′u, z) , N (a
′
u, s
′)
}
|s
]}
(10)
subject to
cu + a
′
u = (1 + r)a+ h
a′u ≥ 0
The value function for a worker who decides to neither work nor search is given by
O (a, s) = max
co,a′o
{
ln co +B
o + βE
[
N (a′o, s
′) |s
]}
(11)
subject to
co + a
′
o = (1 + r)a+ h
a′o ≥ 0
A worker who has an employment opportunity decides whether to work or not after
(s)he observes the idiosyncratic match-specific productivity shock. Matched workers solve
the following decision problem:
max
{
W (a, z) , N e (a)
}
(12)
where N e (a) =
∑
iN (a, si) pis (si). We let I
w (a, z) denote the matched worker’s decision
function, which is 1 if W (a, z) ≥ N e (a) and otherwise zero.
The value function for a worker who decides to work is given by
W (a, z) = max
cw,a′w
{
ln cw + βλN
e (a′w)
+β (1− λ)E
[
max
{
W (a′w, z
′) , N e (a′w)
}
|z
]}
(13)
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subject to
cw + a
′
w = (1 + r)a+ w (a, z)
a′w ≥ 0
The firm’s problem is also formulated recursively. Let J (a, z) denote the value function
to a firm matched with a worker. The value function of a matched firm is then
J (a, z) = z − w (a, z) + 1
1 + r
λ (V − χ)
+
1
1 + r
(1− λ)E
[
max
{
J (a′w (a, z) , z
′) , V − χ
}
|z
]
(14)
where V is the value of unfilled vacancy, a′w (a, z) the matched worker’s optimal saving
function, and χ the firing cost the firm pays when the match is broken up.
The equilibrium number of job vacancies is determined by the following free-entry
condition which states that vacancies earn zero profits, V = 0:
k =
1
1 + r
q (θ)E
[
max
{
J (a′u (a, s) , z) , V
}]
(15)
where k is the job posting cost, q (θ) the firm’s matching probability, a′u (a, s) the job-
searcher’s optimal saving function, and the expectation operator E is taken with respect
to the next period distribution of workers who arrive at the locations with vacancies.
2.4.2 Wage Determination
Let S (a, z) denote the match surplus between a worker and a firm. The match surplus is
defined to be the sum of the payoffs of the worker and the firm, depending upon whether
or not work occurs at that period:
S (a, z) = W (a, z)−N e (a) + J (a, z)− V + χ (16)
The wage is derived by assuming that fixed fractions of the surplus accrue to the worker
and to the firm. That is, the total match surplus is shared according to the Nash product:
w (a, z) = arg max
(
W (a, z)−N e (a)
)γ(
J (a, z)− V + χ
)1−γ
(17)
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subject to the match surplus given in Eq(16), where γ is the worker’s bargaining power.
2.4.3 Distributions of Workers
Let φm (a, z) denote the beginning-of-period number of matched workers and φn (a, s) the
beginning-of-period number of unmatched workers. Recall that the matched workers are
those who have an employment opportunity and the unmatched workers those who do not.
Matched workers then choose whether to work or not, and unmatched workers whether to
search or not.
First, the number of employed workers, µe (a, z), is
µe (a, z) = Iw (a, z)φm (a, z) (18)
Second, the number of job-seekers, µu (a, s), is
µu (a, s) = Is (a, s)
{
pis (s)
∑
z
[
1− Iw (a, z)]φm (a, z) + φn (a, s)} (19)
Finally, the number of nonparticipants, µo (a, s), is
µo (a, s) =
[
1− Is (a, s)]{pis (s)∑
z
[
1− Iw (a, s)]φm (a, z) + φn (a, s)} (20)
For all (a′, z′), the next-period number of matched workers, φm (a′, z′), satisfies
φm (a′, z′) =
∑
Ωw
pi (z′|z) (1− λ)µe (a, z) + 1 {z′ = z}
∑
Ωu
spµu (a, s) (21)
where 1 {A} is an indicator function which takes one if A is true and for all (a′, s′), the
next-period number of unmatched workers, φn (a′, s′), satisfies
φn (a′, s′) = pis (s′)
∑
Ωw
λµe (a, z) +
∑
Ωu
pis (s
′|s) (1− sp)µu (a, s)
+
∑
Ωo
pis (s
′|s)µo (a, s) (22)
where Ωw = {(a, z) |a′ = a′w (a, z)}, Ωu = {(a, s) |a′ = a′u (a, s)} and Ωo =
{
(a, s) |a′ =
a′o (a, s)
}
.
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2.4.4 Definition of Equilibrium
Equilibrium consists of value functions {W (a, z), U(a, s), O(a, s), N(a, s), J(a, z), V },
optimal consumption and saving functions {cw(a, z), cu(a, s), co(a, s), a′w(a, z), a′u(a, s),
a′o(a, s)}, optimal decision functions {Iw(a, z), Is(a, s)}, Nash bargaining wages w(a, z), a
vacancy-to-searcher ratio θ, and a law of motion for the distribution (φm′, φn′) = T (φm, φn),
such that
1. Taking the vacancy-to-searcher ratio, the Nash bargaining wages, the measures of
workers, and the law of motion as given, the optimal saving functions a′w(a, z), a
′
u(a, s)
and a′o(a, s) solve the Bellman equations (13), (10), and (11), respectively.
2. Taking the value functions, the measures of workers and the law of motion as given,
the decision functions Iw(a, z) and Is(a, s) solve (12) and (9), respectively.
3. Taking the value functions as given, the Nash bargaining wages solve (17).
4. Taking the Nash bargaining wages, the decision functions, the firm’s value functions,
the measures of workers and the law of motion as given, the free-entry condition is
satisfied.
5. Taking the optimal saving functions and the decision functions as given, the law of
motion for the distribution is described in (18)-(22).
2.4.5 Labor Force States
As mentioned above, the unemployed are defined as the job-searchers who look for work but
do not find employment, and those who find employment are then classified as employed.
The employment rate, denoted by E, is given by
E =
∑
a,z
(1− λ)µe (a, z) +
∑
a,s
spµu (a, s) (23)
The unemployment-to-population ratio is given by
U =
∑
a,s
(1− sp)µu (a, s) (24)
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Finally, since OLF consists of those who have been working but separated exogenously
with probability λ and those who do not search, the nonparticipation rate is given by
O =
∑
a,z
λµe (a, z) +
∑
a,s
µo (a, s) (25)
3 Calibration
A time period is normalized to be one month, and the interest rate r is therefore set to
.4868 percent, equivalent to an annual interest rate of 6 percent. The worker’s bargaining
power γ is set to .5. Following Andolfatto (1996), the worker-finding probability is set to
q = .5358 which is equivalent to quarterly worker-finding probability .9. The aggregate
job-finding probability p is set to .9, so that the steady state vacancy-to-searcher ratio θ
is given by 1.69. Given p, q and θ, I choose α which satisfies q = (1 + θα)−1/α, so that α
is set to 2.4543.4 I assume that household production h is 10 percent of the average wage.
The monthly discount factor β is chosen so that the model economy displays an average
level of assets equal to 36 months of labor earnings.5 A monthly exogenous separation rate
of 1.5 percent is chosen because the transition rate from working to nonworking is about
3 percent in Table 1. I assume that half of separations are exogenous, so that λ = .015.
Following Bils, Chang and Kim (2007), the persistence of the match-specific shock ρ and
the standard deviation of the match shock σ are set to .97 and .0058, respectively. I choose
Bu and Bo so that the employment rate and the unemployment-to-population ratio of the
model economy are close to the U.S. data, 61.67 percent and 4.06 percent, respectively.6
Finally and most importantly, the mean of signal quality which takes a value between 0
and 1 is set to .5, so that the unconditional mean of signal-generating random variable x is
x = 0. By assuming the persistence of the signal-generating random variable is the same
as the persistence of the match-specific shock, ρx is set to .97. I vary only the standard
deviation of the signal quality shock ση, so that the model economy replicates the U.S.
gross labor force transition rates given in Table 1. All parameter values are summarized
in Table 2
4den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) choose 1.27.
5Bils, Chang and Kim (2007) choose the discount factor so that the model economy displays an average
of assets equal to 18 months of labor earnings. In their model, however, there is no nonparticipation.
6During Jan. 1978 - Dec. 2005, the seasonally adjusted BLS series show that the employment rate is
61.67 percent, the unemployment-to-population ratio 4.06 percent, the nonparticipation rate 34.28 percent
and the unemployment rate 6.19 percent.
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Table 1: Gross Labor-Force Transition Rates for the CPS, 1978-2005, Percent Per Month
(1) Unadjusted
To
Working Unemployed Not in Labor Force
Working 95.62 1.49 2.89
From Unemployed 26.66 51.23 22.11
Not in Labor Force 4.63 2.56 92.82
(2) Adjusted with Abowd and Zellner (1985, Table 5) correction
To
Working Unemployed Not in Labor Force
Working 97.05 1.19 1.76
From Unemployed 22.33 63.42 14.25
Not in Labor Force 2.79 2.27 94.94
Source: Robert Shimer’s tabulations of raw data from the CPS
Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Values
r monthly interest rate .004868
γ worker’s bargaining power .5
θ steady-state vacancy-to-searcher ratio 1.69
α matching function parameter 2.4543
h household production .104
β discount factor .994718
λ exogenous separation rate .015
ρ persistence of match-specific shock .97
σ standard deviation of the shock .0058
ρx persistence of the signal quality .97
x unconditional mean of the signal quality 0
ση conditional standard deviation of the signal quality .4
Bu utility from leisure when searching .9788
Bo utility from leisure when out of the labor force 1.0956
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4 Results
In this section, I begin by presenting the results from the model of search intensity devel-
oped by Pries and Rogerson (2008), and then turn to the model of signal quality.
4.1 Investigating the Model of Search Intensity
I examine the model of search intensity developed by Pries and Rogerson (2008). Pries
and Rogerson (2008) classify people on the basis of whether a person is searching actively
or inactively. The unemployed are those who search actively with intensity sh, while
nonparticipants are those who search inactively with intensity sl. The unemployed workers’
and nonparticipants’ job-finding probabilities are given by shp and slp, respectively, where
p is the aggregate job-finding probability. To be consistent with the model described in
Section 2, I develop a model of search intensity in which workers are risk-averse. The
detailed model is given in the Appendix.
All parameters are set according to Table 2 except for β, Bu, Bo, sh and sl. Similarly,
the monthly discount factor, β, is chosen so that the model economy displays an average
level of assets equal to 36 months of labor earnings. The utilities from leisure when looking
for a job, Bu, and when out of the labor force, Bo, are set to .9246 and 1.0679, respectively,
so that the employment rate and the unemployment-to-population ratio of the model
economy are close to the U.S. data, 61.67 percent and 4.06 percent. The search intensity
when unemployed, sh, and the search intensity when out of the labor force, sl, are set to .247
and .031, respectively, so that the transition rates from unemployment to employment and
from OLF to employment are also close to the U.S. data, 22.33 percent and 2.79 percent,
respectively.
Table 3: Parameter Values for Model of Search Intensity
Parameter Description Values
β discount factor .994839
sh high search intensity .247
sl low search intensity .031
Bu utility from leisure when searching .9246
Bo utility from leisure when out of the labor force 1.0679
Table 4 displays the aggregate statistics of the model of search intensity. It is worth
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noting that in the second panel of Table 4 there are no transitions from unemployment to
OLF. To see why this happens, we need to look at Figure 1. Figure 1 demonstrates that
the distinction between unemployment and OLF is made based on the amount of assets.
Those who accumulate more than a certain amount of assets become nonparticipants and
search for work inactively, while those who accumulate less than a certain amount of assets
remain unemployed and search actively. Since all workers in the model have insufficient
income while they are not working and face borrowing constraints, they cannot move from
unemployment to OLF.
Table 4 also shows that the transition rates from unemployment to employment and
from OLF to employment can be explained by the job-finding probabilities, shp and slp,
which are 22.2 percent (= .247× .9) and 2.8 percent (= .031× .9), respectively. Since the
unemployed cannot move to OLF, the transitions from unemployment to unemployment
consist of the unemployed who do not find employment. On the other hand, the transitions
from OLF to unemployment involve those who find no employment, lose assets while they
are out of the labor force, and realize that an active search is better than an inactive search.
Table 4: Model of Search Intensity
(1) Aggregate Statistics
E U O U/(E + U) w a
61.67% 4.06% 34.27% 6.18% 1.03 35.56
(2) Transition Rates
To
Employed Unemployed OLF
Employed 96.97 0.28 2.76
From Unemployed 22.37 77.63 0.00
OLF 2.81 2.15 95.04
Note: E denotes the employment rate, U the unemployment-to-
population ratio, O the nonparticipation rate, w average wages,
and a average asset holdings.
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Figure 1: Steady State Distribution from Model of Search Intensity
4.2 Model of Signal Quality: Steady State without Firing Costs
I turn now to the model of signal quality developed in Section 2. The results are given in
Table 5 and Figure 2. Table 5 displays the model statistics, and Figure 2 shows the steady
state distribution of the unemployed and nonparticipants over their asset holdings.
In the model of signal quality, the unemployed are defined as those who search but do
not find employment, and it is assumed that each unmatched worker observes signal quality.
Each individual’s job-finding probability is expressed as the aggregate job-finding proba-
bility weighted by the signal quality in his hands, sp, and we focus on a worker’s threshold
signal quality, the signal quality at which the worker is indifferent between searching and
non-searching.
Figure 2, in which the distribution of the unemployed and the distribution of nonpar-
ticipants overlap, demonstrates that those who hold more assets are less likely to search
because they have a high threshold signal quality, while those holding less assets are more
likely to search because they have a low threshold. It is straightforward that those having
high threshold signal qualities also have high possibilities of finding jobs if they decide to
search.
Note that the model of signal quality is able to show the transitions from unemployment
to OLF, 10.7 percent, given in the second panel of Table 5. This is in marked contrast
to the result from the model of search intensity. How can we explain those who move
from unemployment to OLF? The transitions from unemployment to OLF are made when
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Table 5: Model of Signal Quality
(1) Aggregate Statistics
E U O U/(E + U) w a
61.70% 4.06% 34.23% 6.18% 1.04 35.76
(2) Transition Rates
To
Employed Unemployed OLF
Employed 97.90 0.19 1.91
From Unemployed 26.35 62.96 10.69
OLF 3.30 4.05 92.65
Note: E denotes the employment rate, U the unemployment-to-
population ratio, O the nonparticipation rate, w average wages,
and a average asset holdings.
the unemployed who found no employment during the last period receive signals of lower
quality than their thresholds, and decide to leave the labor force. Rather than incur the
costs associated with job search activities, they decide to drop out of the labor force. This
is quite consistent with the discouraged worker effect.7
For nonparticipants who find non-searching to be a better choice than searching, on
the other hand, if they lose some of their assets they will respond to a signal quality of
sufficiently high value, because nonsearching is no longer a better choice. Given a signal
of such quality, they will decide to search and find a job with that degree of probability.
The U.S. data given in Table 1 shows the transition rate from unemployment to em-
ployment, denoted by tr(UE), and the transition rate from unemployment to unemploy-
ment, tr(UU), to be 26.4 percent and 63.0 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the
transition rate from OLF to employment, tr(OE), and the transition rate from OLF to
unemployment, tr(OU), are 2.8 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. The relationship can
be written as follows:
tr (UE)
tr (UU)
< 1 <
tr (OE)
tr (OU)
(26)
The above inequality (26) shows that the average probability with which the unemployed
find a job is much less than the average probability with which those out of the labor force
7The discouraged worker effect is associated with the business cycle, and leads the labor force partic-
ipation rate to a relationship with the business cycle. While we do not consider business cycles in this
paper, we can easily find large flows from unemployment to OLF in the data.
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Figure 2: Steady State Distribution from Model of Signal Quality
find a job conditional on deciding to search.
The model underpredicts tr(OE) and overpredicts tr(OU): tr(OE) is 3.3 percent in
the model but 2.8 percent in the data, and tr(OU) 4.1 percent in the model but 2.3 percent
in the data. The model, nevertheless, has the same qualitative implication:
tr (UE)
tr (UU)
<
tr (OE)
tr (OU)
(27)
The ratio between tr(UE) and tr(UU) is .42(= 26.35/62.96), and the ratio between tr(OE)
and tr(OU) is .81(= 3.30/4.05). This is one of the important contributions made in this
paper. Note that the unemployed have a relatively low threshold signal quality while
nonparticipants have a relatively high threshold signal quality. Suppose workers who were
classified as unemployed in the last period decide to search. We can guess that their
average job-finding probability will be low, because they are willing to search even if they
receive a low signal quality. This leads to the low rate of transition from unemployment
to employment, and the high rate from unemployment to unemployment. In contrast,
suppose workers who were classified as OLF in the last period decide to search. In this
case we can guess that the average job-finding probability will be relatively high, because
they respond only to high signal quality. The rate of transition from OLF to employment
is therefore not much less than that of transition from OLF to unemployment.
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Table 6: Effects of Firing Costs
none 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
E 61.70 61.42 61.07 60.52 59.81 59.34
U 4.06 4.13 4.24 4.33 4.49 4.66
O 34.23 34.45 34.70 35.15 35.70 36.00
U/(E + U) 6.18 6.30 6.49 6.68 6.99 7.28
EU 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17
EO 1.91 1.88 1.86 1.81 1.74 1.69
UE 26.35 25.92 25.68 25.20 24.54 23.62
UO 10.69 10.88 10.75 10.83 11.02 10.99
OE 3.30 3.20 3.05 2.84 2.59 2.43
OU 4.05 4.07 4.12 4.13 4.17 4.20
wages 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
assets 35.76 36.21 36.74 37.61 38.74 39.33
V/S 1.69 1.51 1.33 1.17 1.02 0.91
4.3 Effects of Firing Costs
This subsection discusses the effects of introducing firing costs, as a type of firing tax,
to the model economy. In the search and matching model, firing costs cannot be much
greater than job posting costs; otherwise, no firm will post its vacancy. For that reason,
firing taxes that the government levies are introduced as a fraction of the steady-state job
posting cost. It is also assumed that firing taxes are not rebated to agents, and neither
workers nor firms receive payments from the government.
Table 6 shows the effects of firing costs on the labor market variables. First, firing
costs have a negative effect on the layoff rate. Figure 3 shows that firing costs lower
threshold productivity. Once firing costs are introduced, firms continue their matches at
a productivity level at which they would not when there are no firing restrictions. As a
consequence, the existence of firing costs reduces separations.
Second, firing costs have a negative effect on the job-finding probability. Firing costs
reduce the firm’s expected value from a match, and in turn reduce the number of vacancies
posted. The equilibrium vacancy-to-searcher ratio, denoted by V/S, decreases. A decrease
in the vacancy-to-searcher ratio leads to a decrease in the job-finding probability as well as
in the UE and OE transition rates. In the model, the effect of a decrease in the job-finding
probability is much greater than the effect of a decrease in the layoff rate, and this results
in an increase in the unemployment-to-population ratio.
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Figure 3: Threshold Productivity
Figure 4: Distribution of Unemployment
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Figure 5: Distribution of OLF
Finally, firing costs have a negative effect on the participation rate. A decrease in the
layoff rate due to firing costs makes individuals’ job tenures longer and skew the asset
distribution to the right as in Figure 4 and 5. The number of workers who are located
outside the participation margin increases, and the participation rate decreases. Therefore,
an increase in the unemployment rate follows.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a matching model in which workers are risk-averse and can
be employed, unemployed or out of the labor force. The job-finding process has two
steps: it the first step, each worker receives a piece of information on possible employment
opportunities, and based on how promising the piece of information is each decides whether
to search or not. In the second step, those who decide to search make search efforts and
take costly actions. As nonparticipation is brought into the model, the distinction between
unemployment and OLF is made in a way consistent with the classification of the Current
Population Survey.
A calibrated version of the model shows that the U.S. labor market, especially the gross
labor-force transition rates between employment, unemployment and OLF, is accounted
for. In particular, the transition between employment and OLF, and the transition be-
tween unemployment and OLF can be explained without assuming nonparticipants have
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employment opportunities or adjusting the time period of the model.
Once firing costs are introduced as a firing tax, numerical experiments show that firing
costs have a negative effect on the layoff rate and the job-finding probability. The effect of
a decrease in the job-finding probability is greater than the effect of a decrease in the layoff
rate, and this results in an increase in the unemployment-to-population ratio. Firing costs
also have a negative effect on the participation rate. A decrease in the layoff rate makes
individuals’ job tenures longer and skew the asset distribution to the right. The number of
workers who are located outside the participation margin increases, and the participation
rate decreases.
A Appendix
A.1 Model of Search Intensity
The individual worker’s problem is formulated recursively. Let W (a, z) denote the value
function for a worker who decides to work, U(a) the value function for a worker who
decides to search actively, and O(a) the value function for a worker who decides to search
inactively, where a denotes asset holdings and z idiosyncratic match-specific productivity.
A worker who does not have employment opportunities decides whether to search ac-
tively or inactively. The unmatched workers solve the following decision problem:
N (a) = max
{
U (a) , O (a)
}
(A-1)
The worker’s value of an active search is
U (a) = max
cu,a′u
{
ln cu +B
u + β
(
1− shp)N (a′u)
+βshpE
[
max
{
W (a′u, z) , N (a
′
u)
}]}
(A-2)
subject to
cu + a
′
u = (1 + r)a+ h
a′u ≥ 0
where sh denotes high search intensity and p the equilibrium job-finding probability.
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The worker’s value of an inactive search is
O (a) = max
co,a′o
{
ln co +B
o + β
(
1− slp)N (a′o)
+βslpE
[
max
{
W (a′o, z) , N (a
′
o)
}]}
(A-3)
subject to
co + a
′
o = (1 + r)a+ h
a′o ≥ 0
where sl denotes low search intensity.
A worker who has an employment opportunity decides whether to work or not after
(s)he observes the idiosyncratic match-specific productivity shock. The matched workers
solve the following decision problem:
max
{
W (a, z), N(a)
}
(A-4)
The worker’s value of working is
W (a, z) = max
cw,a′w
{
ln cw + βλN (a
′
w)
+β (1− λ)E
[
max
{
W (a′w, z
′) , N (a′w)
}
|z
]}
(A-5)
subject to
cw + a
′
w = (1 + r)a+ w (a, z)
a′w ≥ 0
The value function to a firm matched with a worker is given by equation (14). The
equilibrium number of job vacancies is however determined by the following free-entry
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condition, which states that vacancies earn zero profits:
k =
1
1 + r
qfh
∑
a
max
{
J (a′u (a) , z) , V
}µu (a)
u
+
1
1 + r
qf l
∑
a
max
{
J (a′o (a) , z) , V
}µo (a)
o
(A-6)
where k is the job posting cost, q (θ) the firm’s matching probability, a′u (a) and a
′
u (a) the
active searchers’ and inactive searchers’ optimal saving functions, respectively, µu and µo
the active searchers’ and inactive searchers’ measures, respectively, and u and o the total
numbers of active searchers and of inactive searchers, respectively. In addition, fh and f l
represent the relative search intensities of job-searchers defined as:
fh =
shu
shu+ slo
(A-7)
f l =
slo
shu+ slo
(A-8)
Similar to equation (17), the wage is determined by generalized Nash bargaining. The
difference from (17) is that the worker’s threat point is given by N(a):
w (a, z) = arg max
(
W (a, z)−N (a)
)γ(
J (a, z)− V + χ
)1−γ
(A-9)
Let µe (a, z), µu (a) and µo (a) denote the time-invariant measures of workers who are
employed, unemployed (searching actively) and out of the labor force (searching inactively),
respectively. For all (a′, z′), the next-period number of employed workers, µe (a′, z′), satis-
fies
µe (a′, z′) =
∑
Ωw
Iw (a′, z′) pi (z′|z) (1− λ)µe (a, z)
+1 {z′ = z}
∑
Ωu
Iw (a′, z′) shpµu (a)
+1 {z′ = z}
∑
Ωo
Iw (a′, z′) slpµo (a) , (A-10)
and for all (a′), the next-period number of unemployed workers (or active job-searchers),
µu (a′), and the next-period number of nonparticipants (or inactive job-searchers), µo (a′),
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satisfy
µu (a′) = Is (a′)
{∑
z′
∑
Ωw
[
1− Iw (a′, z′)
]
pi (z′|z) (1− λ)µe (a, z)
+
∑
Ωw
λµe (a, z) +
∑
Ωu
(
1− shp)µu (a) +∑
Ωo
(
1− slp)µo (a)}, (A-11)
µo (a′) =
[
1− Is (a′)
]{∑
z′
∑
Ωw
[
1− Iw (a′, z′)
]
pi (z′|z) (1− λ)µe (a, z)
+
∑
Ωw
λµe (a, z) +
∑
Ωu
(
1− shp)µu (a) +∑
Ωo
(
1− slp)µo (a)} (A-12)
where Ωw = {(a, z) |a′ = a′w (a, z)}, Ωu = {a|a′ = a′u (a)} and Ωo = {a|a′ = a′o (a)}.
The unemployed are defined as those who look for work actively and nonparticipants
as those who look for work inactively. The aggregate employment rate, unemployment-to-
population ratio and nonparticipation rate are given by
E =
∑
a,z
µe (a, z) (A-13)
U =
∑
a
µu (a) (A-14)
O =
∑
a
µo (a) (A-15)
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